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MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT:
AN ANALYSIS OF ARBITRATION CLAIMS
UNDER SECTION 116
THOMAS B. ARNOLD
A DEQUATE access to effective justice in America today is
hampered by clogged courts and mounting case backlogs.!
Nationally, 23,494 tort cases and 19,928 contract cases in which
the United States was not a party, were filed in United States Dis-
trict Courts during the year ending June 30, 1977. Statistics pro-
vided by the administrative office of the United States Courts
show that 7,396 of those 23,494 tort actions involved claims under
$50,000.2 In an additional 4,724 cases the amount of the claim
was not reported. If those cases are prorated among the cases
where the amount of the claim was reported, the projected num-
ber of tort actions for claims of less than $50,000 rises to 9,257.,
Using the same criteria, an estimated 12,279 contract cases can
be added to the tort case totals.' A potential 21,536 cases could
thus be eliminated from the crowded federal judicial calendar,
if a viable alternative to costly, time-consuming litigation existed.
One of the results of an overburdened judicial system is ever-
increasing delay to the parties who must resolve their disputes
through litigation.' One method of settling disputes in lieu of
litigation is arbitration.! Arbitration may result from either a
I Hearings on S. 2253 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978) (statement of Griffin B. Bell)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].




7 Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180 (1909); Housing Auth. v.
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contract or voluntary agreement to arbitrate, or it may be manda-
tory if a compulsory arbitration statute is in effect. Each of these
forms of arbitration has separate and identifiable characteristics.
Voluntary arbitration is usually binding on the parties, carries
with it a limited right to appeal decisions,8 and precludes the par-
ties' right to a trial de novo if one of them is dissatisfied with the
result.9 Mandatory arbitration, on the other hand, usually does
not bind the parties, and either party may seek a trial de novo.'*
The use of arbitration in the area of products liability could offer
parties a less expensive and more efficient method of settling their
disputes.
In addition, the use of arbitration could ease the burden of
the federal courts since sixty-five percent of all tort actions filed
each year are filed under diversity jurisdiction." Even on the state
and local level, arbitration could have a significant impact on
lessening the strain caused by overcrowded dockets. For example,
in Philadelphia, which has a claim limit of $10,000, 84,210 out
of 87,471 available cases have been disposed of since 1971 1 At the
present time, the Philadelphia court system is trying jury cases
in which suit was instituted in 1973.3 In contrast, the great ma-
jority of cases heard by arbitration panels in Philadelphia are
presented to the panels within one year of their filing date."
With these factors as support, the Department of Commerce
included an arbitration provision in the Model Uniform Product
Henry Ericsson Co., 197 La. 732, 2 So. 2d 195 (1941); Crosby v. State Bd.
of Hail Ins., 113 Mont. 470, 129 P.2d 99 (1942); Bryson v. Higdon, 222
N.C. 17, 21 S.E.2d 836 (1942).
1 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Judicial
review of an arbitration award is more limited than judicial review of a verdict
at trial; whether the arbitrators misconstrued a contract is not an issue for
judicial review, and questions of the fault or neglect of the parties are solely
for the arbitrators' consideration.
' 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 34.10See generally, Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977);
Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Pendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
" 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 19.
"Id. at 74 (statement of Lewis Gordon, chairman, Compulsory Arbitration
Committee, Philadelphia Bar Association).
13 Id. at 76.
14 Id. at 74.
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Liability Act"1 (Act). The Act is now being offered to the states
for their consideration and adoption. This comment explores how
arbitration is used to settle disputes, the constitutionality of man-
datory versus voluntary arbitration, and the provisions of section
116 of the Act."
1544 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). The Department of Commerce published
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act in October 1979. The Act was the
product of the PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
ON PRODUCT LIABILITY (Dep't. Com. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Task Force
REPORT].
1044 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,742 (1979). Section 116 provides:
(A) Applicability.
(1) Any party may by a motion institute a pre-trial arbitration
proceeding in any claim brought under this Act, if the court deter-
mines that:
(a) It is reasonably probable that the amount in dispute is less
than $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs; and
(b) Any non-monetary claims are insubstantial.
(2) Arbitration may not be used if both the claimant and one
or more defendants state that they do not want an arbitration
proceeding.
(B) Rules Governing.
(1) Substantive Rules. The substantive rules of an arbitration
proceeding under this section are those contained in this Act as well
as those in applicable state law.
(2) Procedural Rules. These are the procedural rules of an arbi-
tration proceeding under this section. If this section does not provide
a rule of procedure, reference may be made to the "Uniform
Arbitration Act" or other sources of law. Any reference to other
sources of law must conform to the intent and spirit of this section.
*Optional Subsection
(3) Additional Rules and Administration.
(i) The - (legislature to specify appropriate state agency
or administrative body) is empowered to promulgate additional
procedural rules for this section.
(ii) The (legislature to specify American Arbitration
Association or similar organization) shall carry out the day-to-day
administration of arbitration under this section.
(C) Arbitrators.
(1) Unless the parties agree otherwise, the arbitration shall be
conducted by three persons: an active member of the state bar or
a retired judge of a court of record in the state; an individual who
possesses expertise in the subject matter area that is in dispute;
and a layperson.
(2) Arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with applicable
state law in a manner which will assure fairness and lack of bias.
(D) Arbitrators' Powers.
(1) Each arbitrator to whom a claim is referred has the power,
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, to conduct arbitra-
tion hearings and make awards consistent with the provisions of
this Act.
(2) State laws applicable to subpoenas for attendance of wit-
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ARBITRATION As A MEANS To SETTLE DISPUTES
A brief overview of how arbitration operates to settle civil dis-
putes is necessary to place section 116 of the Act in its proper
nesses and the production of documentary evidence apply in proceed-
ings conducted under this section. Arbitrators shall have the power
to administer oaths and affirmations.
(E) Commencement.
Arbitration hearings shall commence not later than thirty (30)
days after the claim is referred to arbitration unless, for good
cause shown, the court shall extend the period. Hearings shall be
concluded promptly. The court may order the time and place of
the arbitration.
(F) Evidence.
(I) The Federal Rules of Evidence [or a designated state evi-
dence code] may be used as a guide to the admissibility of evidence
in an arbitration hearing.
(2) Strict adherence to the rules of evidence, apart from rele-
vant state rules of privilege, is not required.
(G) Transcript of Proceeding.
A party may have a transcript or recording made of the arbi-
tration hearing at his own expense. A party who has had a tran-
script or recording made shall furnish a copy of the transcript or
recording at cost to any other party upon request.
(H).Arbitration Decision and Judgment.
The arbitration decision and award, if any, shall be filed with
the court promptly after the hearing is concluded. Unless a party
demands a trial pursuant to subsection (I), the decision and award
shall be entered as the judgment of the court. The judgment entered
shall be subject to the same provisions of law, and shall have the
same force and effect as a judgment of the court in a civil action,
except that it shall not be subject to appeal.
(I) Trial Following Arbitration.
(I) Within twenty (20) days after the filing of an arbitration
decision with the court, any party may demand a trial of fact or a
hearing on an issue of law in that court.
(2) Upon such a demand, the action shall be placed on the cal-
endar of the court. Except for the provisions of subsection (3), any
right of trial by jury that a party would otherwise have shall be
preserved inviolate.
(3) At trial, the court shall admit evidence that there has been
an arbitration proceeding, the decision of the arbitration panel, and
the nature and amount of the award, if any. The trier of fact shall
give such evidence whatever weight it deems appropriate.
(4) A party who has demanded a trial but fails to obtain a judg-
ment in the trial court which is more favorable than the arbitration
award, exclusive of interest and costs, shall be assessed the cost of
the arbitration proceeding, including the amount of the arbitration
fees, and-
(i) If this party is a claimant and the arbitration award is in
its favor, the party shall pay the court an amount equivalent to
interest on the arbitration award from the time it was filed; or
(ii) If this party is a product seller, it shall pay interest to the
claimant on the arbitration award from the time it was filed.
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perspective. Arbitration is a means of settling differences between
parties through the investigation and determination of the disputed
matter by one or more unofficial persons selected for that pur-
pose. The parties submit the matter to the arbitrator for deci-
sion and award in lieu of trial."
The method of settling disputes by arbitration originated in
the common law, but arbitration agreements meant very little
because they were not subject to specific enforcement. 8 Common
law arbitration developed through court decisions and today it
coexists with statutory arbitration." Under arbitration statutes,
arbitration agreements may be specifically enforced by either
party and are not revocable at will." The essential features of
modem arbitration statutes include:
1. Irrevocability of any agreement to submit future disputes to
arbitration;
2. Power of a party, pursuant to a court directive, to compel a
recalcitrant party to proceed to arbitration;
3. Provision that any court action instituted in violation of an
arbitration agreement may be stayed until arbitration in the
agreed manner has taken place;
4. Authority of the court to appoint arbitrators and fill vacancies
when the parties do not make the designation, or when arbitra-
tors withdraw or become unable to serve during the arbitration;
5. Restrictions on the court's freedom to review the findings of
facts by the arbitrator and his application of the law;
6. Specification of the grounds on which awards may be attacked
for procedural defects and of the time limit for such chal-
lenges."1
Arbitration traditionally refers to the voluntary agreement of
the parties to submit their dispute to an impartial arbitrator for
a final disposition." When voluntary arbitration is used, there are
no problems with the right to a jury trial or the right of access
" See note 7 supra.
18 M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS 17
(1968).
19 Id. at 18. See also Wark & Co. v. Twelfth & Sansom Corp., 107 A.2d 856
(1954). The New York Arbitration Act of 1921 resulted in basic changes in the
common law concept of arbitration.
"
0See M. DOMKE, supra note 18, at 20.
211d.
22K. SEIDE, A DICTIONARY OF ARBITRATION AND ITs TERMs 27 (1970).
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to the courts. The right to a jury trial in civil cases can be waived,'
and even if there is no express waiver, voluntary entry into a
binding arbitration agreement can readily be characterized as a
waiver of the right.' Similarly, voluntary arbitration agreements
do not violate a party's right of access to the courts.'
In addition to voluntary arbitration, statutes can mandate that
the parties arbitrate their dispute prior to seeking relief in the
courts. Few states have adopted compulsory arbitration plans,"
primarily because of the serious constitutional obstacles such plans
present to the right to a jury trial." To avoid constitutional prob-
lems, the statutes generally provide for non-binding mandatory
arbitration with either side having the right to seek a trial de novo?'
If a trial de novo is allowed, the statute will withstand either
Seventh Amendment2 challenges, or a state's equivalent to the
Seventh Amendment.'
The decision of the arbitrator is called the award and is bind-
ing on the parties to the extent of all matters properly submitted
2 See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. International Harvester Co., 350 S.W.2d 782,
785-86 (Mo. 1961). California requires that a contract to arbitrate medical
malpractice disputes provide in bold red type that "you are giving up your right
to a jury or court trial." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West. Supp. 1980).
Adoption of the notice requirement helps avoid constitutional problems with
the right to trial by jury. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
2'Tuschman Steel Co. v. Tuschman, 181 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ohio 1961).
Arbitration statutes do not oust the jurisdiction of the court, but merely provide
an additional remedy for the parties. See generally In Re Smith, 381 P. 223, 112
A.2d 625 (1955). The court held that restrictions on obtaining a jury trial did
not violate the right of access to the courts.
"' Several states have employed the term "arbitration" to refer to mandatory
screening panels. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE Am. § 2711.21 (Page 1979);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01 (1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.309 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (pre-litigation panel mandatory for claims of
more than $5,000). See also Ladimer, Statutory Provisions for Binding Arbitra-
tion of Medical Malpractice Claims, 76 INS. L. J. 405, 406 (1976).
27 Minneapolis Ry. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). See also Chicago R.I.
& P. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (1919), in which the COurt discussed the nearly
unlimited power of the states to govern the use of a jury in state civil cases;
see generally U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
s See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. LAw § 7501 (McKinney 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01
(Page 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 4 § 161 (Purdon 1980).
See note 10 supra.
SSee generally CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; N.Y. CONs5r. art. 1, S 2; Omo CONST.
art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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and investigated by him under the authority of the submission?
The award can be enforced as an ordinary contract at ommon
law,' by a decree of specific performance,' or it may be entered
and enforced as a court judgment." When the parties voluntarily
agree to arbitrate their dispute, courts have uniformly held that
the only grounds for vacating the award are those provided by
statute.' Therefore, the award will not be vacated unless it was
procured by corruption or fraud, the arbitrators were partial, there
was misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, or the arbitrators
exceeded their authority." Since arbitration statutes do not address
the effect of errors of law or fact, courts generally have not vacated
awards made on the basis of a mere misinterpretation of the law
or some error of fact."
The decision to resort to an arbitration panel may result in a
radically different consequence than would have been the case with
a jury trial. Therefore, the parties to the dispute should carefully
consider the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration before
electing to utilize the procedure. One of the primary advantages
of arbitration is the speed with which a decision is rendered. The
judicial system has reached the point where simply adding more
judges will not necessarily insure adequate and effective justice
for the volume and variety of disputes which the courts face."
"See M. DOMKE, supra note 18, at 275.
32 Baldwin v. Moses, 319 Mass. 401, 66 N.E.2d 24 (1946); Olston v. Oregon
Water Power & R. Co., 52 Or. 343, 96 P. 1095 (1908); cf. Martin v. Vansant,
99 Wash. 106, 168 P. 990 (1917) (case contrasted the activities of an appraiser
and those of an arbitrator and held that the term "award" cannot properly be
applied to the findings of an appraiser).
3 Zelle v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 242 Minn. 439, 65 N.W.2d 583 (1954).
4Myer v. Gray, 188 Iowa 373, 176 N.W. 258 (1920); Lewiston v. Federal
Shoe, Inc., 150 Me. 432, 114 A.2d 248 (1955). An action in assumpsit is an
appropriate vehicle for enforcing an award.
"5See note 10 supra.
"United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588 (1900); 9 U.S.C. S 13 (1970). A
judgment entered under the United States Arbitration Act enforcing an order
which confirms, modifies or corrects an award has the same force and effect as,
and is subject to, all the provisions of law relating to a judgment in an action, and
it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which
it is entered.
37E.g., Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacts Int'l Traders Inc., 375 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1967); Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278 (E.D.
La. 1971).
31978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 16.
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The consequence of clogged courts and mounting backlogs is
not only an overworked judiciary but also litigants frustrated
with unconscionable delays and great expenses in their efforts to
resolve their legal disputes.' Another advantage obtained when
voluntary arbitration is used is a final disposition of the case.'
When the parties voluntarily agree to arbitrate their dispute,
they waive their right to a jury trial." The only grounds for vacat-
ing a voluntary arbitration award are those provided by statute."
Typically, statutes do not provide for vacation of an award unless
there was gross misconduct by the arbitration panel;' therefore,
once the award is rendered, the result is final and is not subject
to a lengthy appeal process.
Several disadvantages accompany the use of arbitration, and
they warrant careful scrutiny by the parties. Arbitration usually
carries no constitutionally guaranteed right to trial under either a
state or the federal constitution." Arbitrators generally do not
have the benefit of judicial instruction concerning the law applic-
able to the dispute before them. ' The arbitrators are not required
to give the reasons for their decisions nor are they required to
make a record of the proceedings, thus considerably reducing the
availability and scope of judicial review of an award."
Arbitration Under State Statutes
Voluntary or compulsory non-binding arbitration in civil cases
has not been used on the national level," but it has been success-
fully utilized by several states.'8 In Pennsylvania, arbitration has
been used for over twenty-five years.' New York," Ohio," Michi-
" Id. at 14.
4"Id. at 34.
41 See note 23 supra.
"9 U.S.C. 5 13 (1970).
4Id.
"See M. DOMKE, supra note 18, at 158-59.
m1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 16.
'See notes 8, 9 supra.
'71978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 17.
"Id.
4Id.
10 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1980).
51 Oo REv. CODE ANN. S 2711.01 (Page 1979).
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gan,2 Arizona!' and California!' all have adopted statutory arbi-
tration schemes, as have many other states."
The use of arbitration at the state level is gradually expanding.
Parties to civil litigation are free to arbitrate any dispute within
the statutory limits of their state's arbitration act. State arbitra-
tion plans have proven so successful that no state which has
initiated one has abandoned it."
Appeal rates following arbitration have ranged from five to
fifteen percent of all cases arbitrated."' In Philadelphia, arbitration
has proven extremely successful, with an appeal rate of less than
ten percent." It is also worth noting that the pattern of monetary
awards and liability determinations in trial de novo verdicts is
markedly similar to that of the arbitration awards." A majority
of the trial court awards are for less than $3,000 and close to
eighty percent are for less than $5,000.0
2 MIc H. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 600.5001 (1968).
53 Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 12-1501 (1963).
S4 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 51280 (West Supp. 1980).
55 UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT, 9 U.S.C. 5 1 (1970); ALASKA STAT.
9.43.010 (Cum. Supp. 1980); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 12-501 (1963); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (1979); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 5 1280 (West Supp. 1980);
COLO. REV. STAT. 5 13-22-201 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-408 (West
1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 5701 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1342 (1977);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.01 (West 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 658-1 (1979);
IDAHO CODE ch. 9, § 7-901 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 101 (1980); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-1 (Burns 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 5, § 401 (1975);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201 (West 1951); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5927
(1967); MD. Ors. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. ch. 251, § 1-19 (1980); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 251, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1961); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5001 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (West 1980); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-2103 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 38.015 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. 5 542:1 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 1975); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 44-7-1 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1980); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-567.1 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 2711.01 (Page 1979);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 801-818 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 33.210 (1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 4, 5161 (Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (1979);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 21-25A-1 (1979); Thx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
art. 224 (Vernon 1974); VA. CODE § 8.01-577 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.04.010 (1980); Ws. STAT. ANN. 5 298.01 (West 1975); Wyo. STAT. ch. 37,
S 1-1025 (1977).
'01978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 17.
57 Id.
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Ohio has developed one of the most successful state arbitration
plans. 1 It is designed to dispose of a large class of cases, involv-
ing relatively small money damages, with a minimum expenditure
of judicial time and funds."2 The system is mandatory but the
awards are not binding upon the parties." The arbitrators are trial
lawyers who sit in panels of three." They render an award for the
plaintiff or for the defendant and determine the amount of dam-
ages, but they do not make a formal finding of fact or render an
opinion."5 The Ohio plan has proven so effective that only 1.5
percent of all cases ordered into arbitration are taken before a
jury for a trial de novo."
Under the Ohio system, the judge to whom the case is assigned
under the individual docket system orders a case into arbitration
at the first pre-trial conference." This occurs only after a reason-
able time for discovery has elapsed.' The arbitrators are instructed
that they are not to attempt settlement, nor are they to inquire as
to the offers or counteroffers which may have been made." Their
function is solely to make a decision." The arbitration system in
Ohio coexists with jury trials, and arbitration awards parallel the
current jury verdicts, without the extremes that jury trials can
produce. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF ARBITRATION
Basic Constitutional Challenges to Mandatory Arbitration
State arbitration statutes have been subjected to specific and
complex attacks based upon both the federal and state constitu-
tions. Three basic constitutional challenges have been raised: (1)
"Id. at 104. See generally OHlo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Page 1979).
1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 104.
'
3 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Page 1979).
'Id. at § 2711.21. See also 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 104.
"See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01-2711.24 (Page 1979).
66 Id.
1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 104.






that the statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;"2 (2) that
they violate the right to free access to the courts under a provi-
sion of a state constitution, 3 and; (3) that they violate the right
to a trial by jury as guaranteed by either the state or federal con-
stitution." With properly worded statutes, mandatory arbitration
can withstand each of these challenges.
The equal protection argument is based upon the fact that arbi-
tration legislation establishes a separate classification as it applies
only to a particular class or group of claimants.' In an equal pro-
tection challenge, the court first determines the degree of judicial
scrutiny to which the challenged statute will be exposed." Tradi-
tionally, equal protection challenges have involved one of two
standards of review: the strict scrutiny test or the rational basis
test." The strict scrutiny test is invoked when a statute creates a
suspect classification" or when it infringes upon fundamental
rights.' Classifications based upon national origin and race tradi-
tionally have been defined as suspect.' Fundamental rights in-
clude the right of interstate travel" and the right of procreation. "
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
73 Lenore, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Panels-A Constitutional Exami-
nation, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 416 (1977); Stewart, Constitutionality of Remedial
Legislation in the Field of Professional Liability, 18 FOR DEF. 73 (1977).
4See note 30 supra.
'
7Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 291, 299, 261 N.W.2d 434, 442 (1978).
The court held that a statute which applied only to a particular class of persons
(medical malpractice claimants) did not violate constitutional guarantees of
equal protection and of due process, did not constitute an unlawful delegation
of judicial authority, and did not impair the right of trial by jury.






0 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). A Virginia statute which pre-
vented marriages solely on the basis of racial classifications was violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
"1 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). The Supreme Court held
that prohibiting the payment of welfare benefits to parties who had been county
residents for less than one year created a classification which constituted an
invidious discrimination and which denied those residents the equal protection
of the law.
"2Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Supreme Court
1981]
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For a statute to withstand constitutional challenges under this
test, the state must demonstrate that the statute satisfies a com-
pelling state interest"' and that no less drastic alternative can ac-
complish the compelling government interest."
The rational basis test is applied when the statutes do not
involve a suspect classification or fundamental right. A statute
is constitutional under this test if a reasonable relationship exists
between the objective of the statute and the classification created."
Statutes analyzed under this minimal level of scrutiny are almost
always upheld."
Arbitration statutes which require a screening panel for claims
or some other form of pre-trial review have been challenged as a
denial of free access to the courts."' The fundamental argument is
that such a requirement imposes a financial burden upon the plain-
tiff in addition to the expenses of trial and thus restricts his right
of free access to the courts.88 State courts unanimously have re-
fused to hold this type of requirement unconstitutional." The
approach of the Florida Supreme Court is typical. In Carter v.
Sparkman," the court noted that because of the constitutional
guarantee of access,"' courts are generally opposed to the imposition
reversed an Oklahoma statute requiring sterilization of certain habitual criminals,
ruling that it violated the fourteenth amendment rights of those parties.
"Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969). In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held a Texas statute which
prohibited abortions during any stage of pregnancy, except to save the mother's
life, unconstitutional, because the state could not show a compelling govern-
mental interest in formulating the statute.
"Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment prohibits states from abridging fundamental rights if the state can-
not prove a compelling governmental interest and the absence of alternatives
which would be less intrusive upon the right.
"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The Supreme Court
found that a reasonable relationship existed between an ordinance which re-
quired some stores to be closed on Sundays and the objectives of the ordinance.
"See P. FRE ND, supra note 76, at 914-16.
"See generally Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 516, 570 P.2d 744 (1977);
Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Prendergast
v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
88 Id.
"Id.
"355 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
91 Id. at 805.
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of any burden on the rights of aggrieved persons to enter the
courts; however, reasonable restrictions might be prescribed by
law." After discussing the Florida acte3 which provided for a re-
view panel in medical malpractice cases, the court held: "Even
though the pre-litigation burden cast upon the claimant reaches
the outer limits of constitutional tolerance, we do not deem it
sufficient to void the medical malpractice law.""
In Strykowski v. Wilkie," the plaintiff claimed that his right of
free access to the courts was violated by several sections of the
Wisconsin statute which provided for a screening panel." In up-
holding the constitutionality of the statute, the court applied this
general rule:
Whatever the precise status of the right of access to the courts,
it is clear that due process is satisfied if the statutory procedures
provide an opportunity to be heard in a court at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner . . . .Due process is flexible
and requires only such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.'
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Paro v. Long-
wood Hospital" held that the requirement of the Massachusetts
act that a plaintiff post a $2,000 bond as a condition to pursuing
his claim in court, after he had suffered an adverse ruling from
the screening panel, did not violate the principle of free access
to the courts." Referring to the act's provision allowing the trial
judge to reduce the amount of the bond for an indigent plaintiff,'"
the court avoided the constitutional issue in the case because the
statute gave the judge broad discretion to set the appropriate
amount of bond."' The court noted that as long as the discretion
was exercised without unreasonably prohibiting meritorious claims,
02 Id.
3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.01 (West 1980).
"Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976).
"81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
"Id.
": Id. at 501-03, 261 N.W.2d at 444-46.





JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
no constitutional violation would exist."2
Virtually every state constitution contains a provision that
guarantees the right to trial by jury."1( Most such provisions pro-
vide that the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate.'" Chal-
lenges to state legislation establishing mandatory arbitration have
relied upon the applicable state constitutional provisions because
the right to trial by jury in civil matters guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution has not been ap-
plied to the states."
The United States Constitution does not prescribe the stage of
an action at which trial by jury must be conducted, or the condi-
tions which may be imposed upon a demand for a jury trial.'
The Fourteenth Amendment..7 does not guarantee that the right
to trial by jury in civil cases will exist in state courts.' Almost
every state constitution contains such a guarantee, however, stated
in terms that have been construed to preserve the right to a jury
trial as it existed at common law.'
The only other requirement that restrictions on the right to a
jury trial must meet, on both the state and federal level, is that
they satisfy the reasonableness test articulated in Capital Traction
Co. v. Hof."' In Hof the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of a District of Columbia statute which gave justice of the peace
courts the authority to render verdicts! by using a jury, subject to
a trial de novo by either party.'' The Court held that the legisla-
ture in distributing judicial power should be given considerable
discretion unless the right to trial by jury is taken away by the
act."' Recent state court decisions have adopted the reasonable-
'02 Id.
103 See note 30 supra.
104/d.
'® Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974).
' Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (1899).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
'
0
" See note 27 supra.
.. See note 30 supra. See generally 50 C.J.S. Juries § 10(a) (1947).
100 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
"'Id. at 44-45. (By act of Feb. 19, 1895, ch. 100, S 1001, justices of the
peace of the District of Columbia were granted original jurisdiction over all civil
pleas where the amount claimed did not exceed $100).
112 Id.
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ness test of Hof and have overruled objections to mandatory
arbitration if a trial de novo is available to the parties."
In 1976, a compulsory arbitration requirement was held to
violate the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Ohio Constitu-
tion in Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center.' In Simon, the
arbitration award was final and there was no provision for a trial
de novo.15 The court held that requiring medical malpractice
claimants to undergo compulsory arbitration without a trial de novo
violated both the Ohio Constitution and the due process and
equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.'
In contrast to the result in Simon, courts have repeatedly sus-
tained mandatory arbitration provisions if they state that the deci-
sion of the arbitrator is not final. The Supreme Court of Arizona
held that an Arizona act which required parties to submit their
malpractice claims to a medical liability review panel"" did not
violate the right to jury trial, even though the panel's findings could
be introduced at a subsequent jury trial.' The court said "[tihe
jury remains the final arbiter of the issues and facts presented.
The statute does not take away the right of the party to have the
matter finally and fully determined by the jury..".
In another case involving a medical malpractice review panel,t'"
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the Nebraska act only
provided for a review to determine if there was any basis for the
claim."' If the plaintiff disagreed with the determination of the
panel, he still could obtain access to the courts.' Answering the
11-3 See generally Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977);
Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 87, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
114 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio 1976).
115 Id. at 907.
"Id. at 906-07.
11' Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977). The court con-
sidered the Arizona Medical Malpractice Act, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 12-567
(West Supp. 1979).
"8 Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 567, 580, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (1977).
119 Id.
12 0Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). See also
NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2840-47 (1976).
" 199 Neb. at 103, 256 N.W.2d at 663.
"1/d. at 104, 256 N.W.2d at 664.
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defendant's contention that use of the medical review panel inter-
fered with the constitutional right to trial by jury because its report
could be introduced as evidence and might be adverse to the
plaintiff's ability to obtain a favorable jury verdict, the court held:
"Historically, jurors for the most part have proven their independ-
ence. They guard their roles with a unique jealousy."'"
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Attorney General of
Maryland v. Johnson" considered a health care malpractice statute
which required that claims be presented to an arbitration panel
for an initial assessment of liability and damages before they
could be brought before a trial court. In holding for the defend-
ants, the court noted that the right to trial by jury is violated
only where the statute closes the courts to the litigants and makes
the decision of the arbitrator final and binding upon the parties."
The statute in Johnson merely required that malpractice claims
be submitted to nonbinding arbitration before suit could be filed.'"
The decision of the panel was not a final determination of the
controversy."'2
Constitutional Problems of Voluntary Arbitration
While it is clear that statutes cannot mandate that parties be
bound by the results of compulsory arbitration, voluntary arbi-
tration is usually binding upon the parties and judicial review of the
arbitrator's decision is limited."8 Binding arbitration is a process
in which the parties voluntarily submit specified present or future
controversies to a neutral party for final determination of the
issues.'" When voluntary arbitration is conducted according to
the terms of the arbitration agreement and the legal prerequisites,
the determination of the arbitrator is enforceable as a court judg-
ment."' Voluntary agreements to arbitrate are made enforceable
23Italpeon v. Gozan, 351 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748 (1977).
' 282 Md. 168, 385 A.2d 57 (1978).
"'Id. at 177, 395 A.2d at 66.
"2'MD. Crs. & JtU. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01-3-2A-09 (1980).
127 Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 168, 176, 385 A.2d 57, 65 (1978).
"'See note 8 supra.
1 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 34.
130 Ladimer & Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Laws, Programs,
Cases, INS. LAw J. 335, 335-36 (June 1977).
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by statute in forty states.' Voluntary arbitration can be binding
upon the parties without violating their constitutional guarantee
of a trial by jury because the agreement to arbitrate constitutes a
waiver of the constitutional right.1"
The Supreme Court has ruled that a voluntary agreement to
arbitrate should be accorded the same deference as is given to
any other clause by which the parties select a specific forum." In
Wilko v. Swani, " the Court held that reasonable interpretations
of law made by the arbitrators are not subject to judicial review
for errors in interpretation; only a manifest disregard of the law
by the arbitrators would prompt judicial review."
Furthermore, courts uniformly have held that the only grounds
for vacating a voluntary arbitration award are those provided by
statute." Typically, an arbitration statute provides, for vacating
an award where it was procured by corruption or by fraud, where
the arbitrators were partial, where there was misconduct by the
arbitrators, or where the arbitrators exceeded their authority."'
In addition to withstanding constitutional attacks regarding the
denial of the right to trial by jury, voluntary arbitration agree-
ments can withstand constitutional attacks based upon their sup-
posed denial of access to the courts and their alleged violation of
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for the same
reasons that mandatory arbitration statutes withstand such at-
tacks."
Arbitration statutes that change the substantive or procedural
rights of the parties, as those rights were defined by the common
law, have been upheld over numerous constitutional objections.'
"'Lash, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Disputes as a Response to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Panacea or Pandora's Box for Insurers?, 46 INS.
COUNSEL J. 102, 105 (Jan. 1979).
Im Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
133 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
1-4346 U.S. 427 (1953).
135 Id. at 436.
136 E.g., Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacts Int'l Traders Inc., 375 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1967); Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278
(E.D. La. 1971).
W37See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West
1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4210 (West 1951).
'See notes 71-75 supra, and accompanying text.
"'See In Re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955).
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Courts of various jurisdictions have held that arbitration statutes
do not deprive the parties of their property without due process
of law," that the statutes do not unconstitutionally confer judicial
power upon private individuals,"' that they do not violate consti-
tutional provisions which vest the judicial power solely in duly
constituted courts," and that they do not impair the obligation of
contracts." The parties waive these rights when they voluntarily
submit to arbitration.' "
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS OF SECTION 116 OF THE
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
With the tremendous judicial backlog of cases in mind," the
Department of Commerce included an arbitration provision in
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act (Act) when it was pub-
lished on October 31, 1979.'" One of the primary purposes of
the Act, which is currently being offered to the states for their
consideration, is to ensure that persons injured by unreasonably
unsafe products receive reasonable compensation for their in-
juries." Prior to formulating the Act, the Department of Com-
merce had chaired an eighteen month long interagency study of
product liability problems and had issued an extensive report.
The origin of the Act can be traced to that final report which
examined product liability problems from the viewpoints of the
manufacturer, the user of component parts (such as the airline
industry) and the injured consumer.'
The Final Report of the Federal Interagency Task Force on
Product Liability" (Task Force Report) found that there was a
140 See Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc., v. Goldberg, M. & Co., Inc., 253 N.Y.
382, 384, 171 N.E. 579, 581 (1930).
141 See Snyder v. Superior Court of Amador County, 24 Cal. App. 2d 263,
265, 74 P.2d 782, 784 (1938).
142 See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 277 (1931).
"
TM See Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 265, 130 N.E. 288, 292
(1921).
'
T M Id. at 264, 130 N.E. at 291.
1T 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 16.
14044 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
147 Id.
148 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15.
'4ld.
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need for uniformity in product liability insurance rates because
they are set on a national basis."' This problem does not exist
with other forms of liability insurance because the rates are set
on a state-by-state basis."1 Stabilization of product liability in-
surance rates could have a significant effect on the airline industry
by giving the industry a degree of control over one of its costs,
and could even result in decreased airline fares.
The model law is designed to meet the needs of the users, sellers
and insurers of products.' Sellers and insurers require uniformity
in product liability law so that they can know the rules by which
they will be judged." Users, on the other hand, are entitled to
assurances that their rights will be protected and that those rights
will not be restricted by reform legislation drafted in a crisis
atmosphere." ' Six criteria were used in formulating the provisions
of the model law: (1) to ensure that persons injured by unreason-
ably unsafe products receive reasonable compensation for their
injuries; (2) to ensure the availability of affordable product lia-
bility insurance with adequate coverage to protect sellers that
engage in reasonably safe manufacturing practices; (3) to give
incentives for loss prevention on the parties who are best able to
accomplish that goal; (4) to expedite the reparations process from
the time of injury to the time the claim is paid; (5) to minimize
the total amount of accident costs, prevention costs and transac-
tion costs, and; (6) to use clear and concise language."'
The Task Force Report suggests that mandatory non-binding
arbitration may result in more accurate decisions, that it may re-
duce the overall costs of litigation, and that it may expedite the
decision-making process in product liability cases.' ' The Task
Force Report concluded that cases which were submitted to arbi-
tration would be decided more accurately because a small group,
with a member who is an expert in the field, should be more able
1'044 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). (Other forms of liability insurance, such as





15 Id. at 62,714-15.
I" Id. at 62,742 (section 116(A)(2)).
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to comprehend the esoteric details of complex product liability
cases.5' Over time, the arbitration process would develop a re-
source pool of neutral experts who would be less easily misled in
technical areas than a jury of laypersons."' In addition, the arbi-
trators themselves would be less affected by the emotional aspects
of the case and by the artistry of counsel.5" Finally, the privacy of
arbitration compared to the openness of a judicial proceeding,
would prompt more complete revelation of special manufactur-
ing designs or processes, which in turn, would permit more ac-
curate judgments.'"
Contrary to the recommendation of the Task Force Report,
section 116 of the Act does not provide for mandatory arbitra-
tion."' Instead, section 116 provides for voluntary non-binding
arbitration, with the possibility of being assessed costs as the only
deterrent to demanding a trial following arbitration."'
Analysis of Section 116
Delays in the reparations process seriously injures claimants
who cannot afford long delays between the time they are injured
and the time they are paid.1" The Act, therefore emphasizes arbi-
tration and other devices that will help to expedite the reparations
process.'" Section 116 of the Act discusses the availability of arbi-
tration to settle adverse claims. ' "
Under section 116 any party, by filing a motion, may request
that a non-binding, pre-trial arbitration proceeding be instituted
for any claim brought under the Act, if the court determines that
it is reasonably probable that the amount in dispute is less than
$50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and that any non-monetary
claims are insubstantial. ' " Arbitration under the Act is strictly vol-





16144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,742 (1979).
162 Id. at 62,742-43.
Id. at 62,715.
164 Id.
10 Id. at 62,742-43.
1
" ld. at 62,742 (Section 116(A)(2)).
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untary; it may not be used if the claimant or any of the defendants
state that they do not desire an arbitration proceeding.'
The substantive rules of an arbitration proceeding under sec-
tion 116 are used in addition to the applicable state law.' Pro-
cedural rules are also contained within the Act, where a pro-
cedural point is not covered by the Act, reference to the Uniform
Arbitration Act' or to any other source of law which conforms
to the intent and spirit of the Act is proper.7' The procedural
framework of section 116 is constructed to assure that states have
the flexibility to meet their individual needs, therefore, the states
have considerable freedom in selecting arbitration procedures.
1 71
Panel Selection Procedure
Unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitration under the Act
is conducted by a panel of three persons: (1) an active member of
the state bar or a retired judge of a court of record in the state;
(2) an individual who possesses expertise in the subject matter of
the dispute, and; (3) a layperson.Y The Act provides that the
arbitrators are to be selected in accordance with state law in a
manner which will assure their fairness and lack of bias.!" The
Act does not fix the amount of compensation to be paid to the
arbitrators, leaving the determination of the appropriate payment
to the individual states.
The composition of the arbitration panel assures the parties
that an individual familiar with the scientific nature of product
liability problems will hear their dispute, and should serve as a
deterrent to the presentation of biased expert testimony.!" In addi-
'6 7 Id. (section 116(A)(1)(c)).
'
081d. (section 116(B)(1)).
1-99 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
17044 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,742 (section 116(B)(1)).
17Id. at 62,742 (section 116(B)(3)(i), (ii)). The Act contains two optional
clauses which deal with the procedural aspects of the arbitration provision.
The first optional provision allows the state legislature to specify that a particular
state agency or administrative body is empowered to promulgate additional
procedural rules to supplement those in the section. The second provision allows
the state legislature to specify that the American Arbitration Association or a
similar organization should carry out the day-to-day administration of arbi-
tration under section 116.
172 Id. (section 116(C)(1)).
731d. (section 116(C)(2)).
1" Id. at 62,743.
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tion, the presence of a layperson on the panel is intended to en-
sure that the consumer perspective toward product liability and
product safety is represented."1
While the Act does not describe how a state is to select its
arbitrators or specify the compensation they are to receive,
several procedures are available to aid the parties in selecting
qualified persons for the panel. To ensure that the panel is im-
partial, a state may require that each candidate discloses any
personal acquaintance he may have with the parties or their coun-
sel and that each candidate submit to voir dire examination."' a
The arbitrators may be court-appointed, or the parties and the
court may combine to select them."' The state also retains the op-
tion to have an outside body, such as the American Arbitration
Association, " select a pool of candidates and then to allow each
party to reject certain candidates, with the panel being selected
from the remaining candidates in accordance with the parties'
preferences.' "
The Act is silent on the question of when the arbitration panel
surrenders its authority but under general arbitration provisions,
the authority of the arbitrators terminates with the making of a
valid, final award.' After that time, they are powerless to modify
or revoke the award, or to make a new award relating to the same
issues.'' An exception to this rule exists when the parties agree
to further action by the arbitrators as a continuation of the origi-
nal submission after a supposedly final award has been made; in
such cases, the panel is again clothed with its former authority.'
"75 Id. at 62,744.
7ISee generally, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5045(1), (2) (Supp.
1978).
17See generally, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840, 2841 (Supp. 1978);
Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(A) (Supp. 1976).
1T The American Arbitration Association is primarily used to settle com-
mercial disputes and it conducts its hearings under an extensive set of rules.
"79See generally, e.g., MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 600.5044(4), (5) (Supp.
1978).
180Bayne v. Morris, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 97, 99 (1865).
181 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 553
(1957). Where arbitrators returned an award that purported to be complete and
final they became functi officio, and the fact that the award was subject to suc-
cessful attack in the courts did not restore authority to the arbitrators to make a
supplementary award.
1'82 Jannis v. Ellis, 149 Cal. App. 2d 751, 753, 308 P.2d 750, 752 (1957).
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In conducting the hearing, the arbitration panel must observe
the jurisdictional boundaries conferred upon it by the agreement
of the parties.' Since the function of the arbitrators is analogous
to that of a court and since their duties require that they exercise
their judgment, arbitrators enjoy immunity from private civil
actions for damages caused by the judicial acts necessary to arrive
at their decision."' They are not liable for negligence, fraud or
misconduct, even where it is sufficient to invalidate the award.'"
Rules of Evidence in Arbitration Proceedings
The essence of the arbitration process is its freedom from the
formalities of ordinary judicial procedure.' " Respecting this con-
cept, the Act provides that strict adherence to the rules of evidence,
other than the rules of privilege, is not required." The Federal
Rules of Evidence are suggested as a guide, but a state can desig-
nate that its own evidence code be followed."'
It is a well-established principle of arbitration law and prac-
tice that judicial rules of evidence regarding the admissibility of
evidence will not prevail.'" The fundamental differences between
the factfinding process of a judicial tribunal and that of a panel
of arbitrators are summarized in Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer."' The court ruled that arbitrators
are not bound by the rules of evidence and that they may consider
hearsay and other incompetent testimony; that their decision may
be against the weight of the evidence presented; that they may
draw upon their personal knowledge in making an award; that
they need not disclose the facts or the reasons behind their award;
'8Acme Cut Stone Co. v. New Center Dev. Corp., 281 Mich. 32, 274 N.W.
700 (1937).
184Craviolini v. Scholer & Fuller Assoc. Architects, 89 Ariz. 24, 357 P.2d
611 (1960); Bever v. Brown, 56 Iowa 565, 9 N.W. 911 (1881); Gammel v.
Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955).
185 Id.
'"See Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 212 P.2d 233 (1949); Cassara v.
Wofford, 55 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1951).
18744 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,742 (1979) (section 116(F)(2)).
'88d. at 62,742 (section 116(F)(1)).
189Frantz v. Inter-Ins. Exch. of the Auto. Club of Southern Cal., 229 Cal.
App. 2d 269, 40 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1964); Coulson, Arbitration Procedures for
Receiving Proof in Commercial Arbitration, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 63 (1966).
1020 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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that they are not subject to judicial review on the issue of their
allegedly erroneous construction of a contract; that they have
exclusive authority to decide questions of the parties' fault or
neglect; and that their errors of judgment are merely a risk of
selecting arbitration."'
The common law rules of evidence are not binding upon and
do not apply to arbitration panels.""2 Arbitrators have discretionary
power to admit any evidence the parties may wish to present
through witnesses or by documents."3 Rulings of arbitrators on the
admissibility of evidence are not subject to judicial review, since
such a practice would "result only in waste of time, the interrup-
tion of the arbitration proceeding, and encourage delaying tac-
tics . .. . ,
In Petroleum Separating Co. v. Interamerican Refining Corp.,"'
the court noted that in a traditional arbitration proceeding the
arbitrator could admit hearsay evidence.' When one of the par-
ties objected to the admission of the hearsay statements, the
court held that "[i]f the parties wish to rely on such technical
objections they should not include arbitration clauses in their
contracts.""... While an award will not be annulled because the
arbitrators admitted hearsay evidence, the practical rule requires
that such evidence be admitted sparingly as the party who made
the original statement cannot be examined to ascertain the cir-
cumstances under which the statement was made."'
Where exceptions to the rule against hearsay have been estab-
lished, either by statute or by the courts, arbitrators have been
inclined to apply them."' For example, exceptions applicable to
1"' Id. at 362.
"12 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 252
F. Supp. 961 (D.D.C. 1966).
"3 Compania Panemena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A. v. J.E. Hurley Lumber
Co., 244 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1957).
"4 Id.
95 296 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Weinstein, Probltive Force of
Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 347 (1960).
"'1 Petroleum Separating Co. v. Interamerican Refining Corp., 296 F.2d 124,
130 (2d Cir. 1961).
197 Id.
"' F. KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION 100-01 (1941).
9 Id. at 101.
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admissions, to declarations against interest, and to business en-
tries are usually enforced by arbitrators."' If doubt exists whether
certain evidence is admissible under one of the exceptions, the
better practice is to admit it because the exclusion of relevant
evidence may lead to an annulment of the award."'
Formal rules concerning the admissibility and the weight and
sufficiency of evidence do not bind arbitrators unless a statute'
or the agreement to arbitrate& ' directs that they shall do so. In
the absence of such a statute or an agreement, the requirement
that evidence, if offered, will be received and considered.' Arbi-
trators should balance the evidence they receive from each party.
They should be careful not to receive excessive evidence from one
party while excluding evidence from the other party.' Even if
an arbitrator is satisfied that a sufficient amount of evidence has
been received, it is better for him to accept additional evidence
because courts rarely vacate awards due to the admission of
questionable testimony.'
Arbitrators have the discretion to solicit evidence by question-
ing a witness themselves2"7 and to request that a party's attorney
produce additional evidence which may prove pertinent in sup-
porting or disallowing the claim.' One of the principal differences
between a trial and an arbitration hearing is that the fact-finder
at a trial, either a judge or a jury, must rely entirely on the facts
adduced by the witnesses, while the arbitrators may draw upon
their personal knowledge in making the award' and even them-
2 "Id.
201 Id.
20 Burchell v. Marsh, 15 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1856). (Although admissibility
of evidence is predominantly a question of law, it may be ruled on by arbitrators.)
2 Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T. Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 288, 174 P.2d 441
(1946). Where a controversy is submitted to arbitration under local rules that
permit a written statement of facts and written arguments, no special proof
beyond such statements is required.
204Second Soc. of Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 518, 109 N.E.
384 (1915).
25M. DoMKE, supra note 18, at 237.
21 See, e.g., Avila Fabrics, Inc. v. Excel Garment Mfg. Co., 135 N.Y.2d 182
(1954).
207Graham v. Graham, 9 Pa. 254 (1848).
'"See M. DOMKE, supra note 18, at 237.
"9 American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d
448 (2d Cir. 1944).
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selves testify where the exigencies of the case require this extra-
ordinary procedure. °
Receiving evidence in the presence of the parties is a funda-
mental right applicable to arbitration proceedings. It is grounded
in both practice and law and is based upon a party's right to hear
what is said against him and to have the opportunity to reply to
such statements. 1' An exception to the presence requirement is
when a party has been notified of a hearing and fails to attend.
This failure to attend is considered a waiver of the right."12
Judicial Review and Requests for New Trials
An award before a court for any purpose will be construed
to be upheld if at all possible. Every factor will be interpreted in
its favor, consistent with the law. Courts favor arbitration pro-
ceedings since they provide a quick, amicable and inexpensive
method of settling private disputes, and they will make every fair
presumption to sustain awards."1 A court will enforce or set aside
an award based upon its validity, but the merits of a controversy
submitted to arbitration and the amount of the award are not
subject to judicial review." The form and sufficiency of the evi-
dence upon which the arbitrators base their decision likewise are
not matters for judicial review."1 Any basis for review of an award
which does exist must be established by statute; thus an award
generally will not be vacated unless it was procured by corruption
or fraud, unless the arbitrators were not impartial, unless there was
misconduct by the arbitrators, or unless they exceeded their
authority.1
Section 116 allows either party to exercise its option to demand
a jury trial following arbitration; however, the demand must be
made within twenty days of the issuance of the award.1' If the
210 Graham v. Graham, 9 Pa. 254 (1848).
21 See M. DOMKE, supra note 18, at 101.
212 Id.
'13 West Towns Bus Co. v. Division 241 Amalgamated Assoc., 26 Ill. App. 2d
398, 168 N.E.2d 473 (1960); General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Harmon, 288 Ky.
624, 157 S.W.2d 126 (1941).
214 Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 216 Minn. 27, 11 N.W.2d,
649 (1954).
212 Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, Inc., 74 F.2d 533 (4th
Cir. 1935).
21' See note 36 supra.
21744 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,742 (1979) (section 116(I)(1)).
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request is timely made, the case will be placed on the trial calen-
dar. '18 At trial, the court will admit evidence showing that an
arbitration proceeding was held, documenting the decision of the
arbitration panel, and describing the nature and amount of the
award, if one was made. 9 The trier of fact is allowed to weigh
this evidence as it deems appropriate.'
In addition to admitting evidence of the results of the arbitra-
tion hearing, section 116 contains other provisions which serve
as deterrents to ill-considered appeals:.' If a party appeals and fails
to obtain a judgment more favorable to it than was the arbitration
award, the court will assess the cost of the arbitration proceeding
against the party.' If this appealing party is a claimant and the
arbitration award was in its favor, the party shall pay to the court
an amount equivalent to interest on the award from the date it
was issued. ' If this appealing party is a seller of the product, the
seller shall pay interest to the claimant on the arbitration award
from the date it was issued."
CONCLUSION
One of the basic functions of any arbitration is to expedite the
reparations process from the time of the injury until the claim is
paid. This objective is accomplished by removing the parties and
their disputes from crowded judicial dockets. The objective is de-
feated if a substantial number of cases are restored to the dockets
because one of the parties was dissatisfied with the results of the
arbitration proceeding.
An initial problem which will confront judges in their appli-
cation of section 116 is the determination of which claims fall
below the $50,000 limit of the statute. The only language section
116 offers to resolve this problem is the phrase "it is reasonably
probable that the amount in dispute is less than $50,000." ' No




221 Id. at 62,743 (section 116(I)(4)(i), (ii)).
222 Id. (section 116 (1)(4) ).
"11Jd. (section 116(I)(4)(i)).
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'Id. at 62,742 (section 116(A)(1)).
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guidelines are provided for making the determination of whether
the value of a claim is more or less than $50,000. Since section
116 deals with voluntary arbitration, this potential problem might
never sufficiently mature to invoke a decision by a court because
the parties will have agreed that their dispute falls below the
$50,000 limit.
Another criticism of the Act is that the rules of evidence under
which the arbitration will be conducted are not articulated with
a sufficient degree of definiteness. Section 116 provides that the
Federal Rules of Evidence may be adopted for arbitration pro-
ceedings or that a state can adopt its own evidence code.' The
Act also provides that strict adherence to the rules of evidence,
with the exception of those rules pertaining to privilege, is not
required."' The Act gives no guidance on the question of how
evidentiary conflicts should be resolved. After reading section 116,
the parties would not know that hearsay statements are accept-
able testimony in an arbitration proceeding,"s that the decision of
the arbitrators may be against the weight of the evidence,' that
the arbitrators may draw upon their personal experience when
making an award,' or that the award is not subject to judicial
review.
1
The Act is also deficient in failing to inform its readers that
even the common law rules of evidence are not binding upon arbi-
tration panels.' Rulings of arbitrators on the admissibility of
evidence are not subject to judicial review,' but the Act fails to
address the problem. Granted, the essence of arbitration un-
doubtedly is its informal nature, but the Act leaves too many ques-
tions unanswered in the area of evidentiary procedures.
The major criticism of the Act is that its drafters elected to have
voluntary instead of mandatory arbitration. The decision to utilize
voluntary arbitration probably will have a debilitating effect on
2m d. (section 116(F)(1)).
2 7 Id. (section 116(F)(2)).







one of the stated goals of the Act, "[t]o expedite the reparation
process from time of injury to the time the claim is paid."" This
is especially true since the voluntary arbitration is also non-
binding. Arbitration, under the traditional definition, is "the re-
ferral of a dispute by voluntary agreement of the parties to one or
more impartial arbitrators for a final and binding decision"' (em-
phasis added).
The decision to adopt voluntary, non-binding arbitration is
even more puzzling when compared to the successful state arbi-
tration models, which use compulsory non-binding arbitration.
Under compulsory arbitration statutes, all cases which meet the
statutory qualifications are removed from the judicial framework
and heard by arbitration panels. Former United States Attorney
General Griffin Bell has claimed that mandatory arbitration could
significantly reduce the backlog of cases clogging the federal courts
since many actions filed in federal courts are resolved by settle-
ment before trial, and many other settlements occur only after
substantial preparation expenses have been incurred.'
The potential effectiveness of section 116 in reducing the num-
ber of product liability claims facing the courts must be questioned
since the section has taken its provisions from two different types
of arbitration statutes and has effectively discarded the best parts of
each type. To be effective by traditional standards, arbitration
should either be voluntary and binding or it should be mandatory
with either party being given the right to appeal the decision and
the award. Each of these systems has proven independently effec-
tive, but they are incompatible when combined.
When binding voluntary arbitration is used, courts are assured
that they will never hear the case because the decision of the
arbitrator is final and is not subject to appeal.' Likewise, when
mandatory non-binding arbitration is used, courts are similarly
assured that the vast majority of cases will be disposed of outside
the judicial framework since appeals historically have occurred in
no more than fifteen percent of all cases."'
' Id. at 62,715.
"31978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 34.
2 Id. at 16.
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Under section 116 of the Act, the primary incentives for the
parties to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration would be
the possibility of avoiding long delays and the likelihood that a
shorter hearing would result. Another possible inducement to the
parties would be that less expensive preparation is required for an
informal arbitration hearing than for a formal trial. It has been
estimated, however, that in cases involving claims of less than
$50,000 the cost of preparing and conducting a formal trial would
not be substantially more than the expenses incurred in arbitra-
tion.
The penalties for unnecessarily requesting a trial de novo are
minimal under section 116. If a litigant demands a trial follow-
ing arbitration and fails to obtain a judgment more favorable to
him than was the arbitration award, he is required to pay the costs
of arbitration.' Since the expenses for an arbitration are usually
rather small and since the arbitrator's fees are generally not more
than $150, the proposed disincentive will seldom be significant.
An additional penalty forces the appellant to pay interest on the
arbitration award from the date the case was filed, but this would
be a substantial penalty only if a large arbitration award were
involved.
It is doubtful that section 116 will have any significant impact
on reducing the number of product liability cases which enter our
already overburdened judicial system. Since section 116 only pro-
vides for voluntary arbitration, many claims which would be de-
cided by arbitrators under a mandatory system will escape the
arbitration process. In addition, the disincentives imposed by sec-
tion 116 are not sufficient to serve as an economic deterrent to
parties who desire to demand a trial following arbitration. Finally,
statutes which provide for a trial de novo following arbitration
involve significantly lower claim limits than the $50,000 ceiling
of section 116. Rates of appeal when the claims involve up to
$50,000 will probably be significantly higher than the five to fifteen
percent rate experienced by various states, thus requiring many
parties to incur the costs of two trials.'
9 
Id.
24044 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
"' 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 93.
